Abstract This paper documents and assesses subregional variation among white southerners in presidential voting behavior and a variety of issue attitudes. I demonstrate that whites in the South remain consistently distinct from those in the rest of the nation, but heterogeneously so: whites in the Deep South are generally far more conservative than their Peripheral South neighbors. I also assess how the region's disproportionate concentration of born-again Christians can confound assessments of regional and state coefficients when properly accounted for in regression models. By demonstrating the continuing distinctiveness of the white South, the significant variation present within the region, and the interrelationship of region and religion, these results have theoretical and methodological implications for the study of American politics. In this paper, I offer an empirical assessment of southern white conservatism in the twenty-first century. In doing so, I test certain conventional theories of southern politics, as well as introduce a few new ones. Scholars have long argued for the general distinctiveness of the South (Key, 2006 (Key, [1949 ; Black and Black, 1987, 2002; Kousser, 2010) . Some have further argued for distinguishing between the more peripheral parts of the region and the deeper, more genuinely "southern" areas -but this line of reasoning has recently come under attack (Ibid.; for the critique, see Shafer and Johnston, 2006) . In this paper, I test the validity of these distinctions in the twenty-first century using large-N datasets that allow for more fine-grained analysis than prior research. I also offer one significant new addition to the literature on the South: an initial assessment of the relationship between the disproportionate concentration of white born-again Christians in the South and the supposed distinctiveness of the region. In effect, this is an assessment of the distinction between composition -differences due to the greater concentration of certain demographic 1 groups or religious identities in a given area -and what might very roughly be called culture -that difference which remains after compositional differences are accounted for.
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I argue that the white South remains distinct in the twenty-first century, but the Deep South still especially so. As such, I push back against arguments that the South no longer merits attention in its own right, as well as arguments that subregional variation has subsided over time to the point where it can be ignored. I further argue, however, that regionalism and religion are too often intricately bound up in the South that care must be taken to distinguish between them. Properly accounting for this greater concentration lowers the estimate of the southern effect on certain culture wars issues, especially policy-specific questions about gay marriage and abortion. However, the southern effect remains generally robust elsewhere.
Overall, then, I argue for a social scientific understanding of southern white heterogeneity.
The South is a distinctive region that is itself internally varied in a complex, but ultimately understandable, manner; it is also a uniquely Evangelical region that is shaped by this concentration of a particular religious identification in some issue areas, but not in others.
By demonstrating the continuing significance of the South and the substantial variation within the region -and integrating the study of born-again Christian religious identification firmly into the study of southern white attitudes -these results have clear implications for studies of regionalism in American politics, as well as the role of religion in individual attitudes.
Background and Literature Review
A few explanatory notes are in order regarding the study of the South in general, the study of southern whites in particular, and the focus on religion rather than other factors impacting southern white attitudes and behavior.
First, why the South but not some other region? This paper looks at the South in comparison to a general non-southern category, which can lend itself to easy critique: Why the South, but not the West, as the key area of interest? Why the generalized non-South as the comparison group, rather than a series of comparisons to a range of other regional categories? Why care about the difference between the Deep South and Peripheral South without similar regard to differences between New England and the Middle Atlantic? I offer three reasons: (1) despite the long history of attention to the unique role of the South in American politics, there has been increasing debate about whether this is still meritedand I argue that it is; (2) Peripheral South states like Virginia and Florida were among the top "tipping point" states in the 2012 election, according to websites like FiveThirtyEight -suggesting an increased importance of at least parts of the region to the Electoral College strategies of presidential campaigns; and (3) one article can necessarily only focus on so much, and I choose the South for the prior reasons. This justification is necessarily imperfect, but I argue the choice is merited.
Second, why white southerners rather than the South as a whole? I argue the focus on whites is justified for a number of reasons. Rather than explaining variation in all of the South, I am particularly interested in white conservatism. This grounds the analysis in a subject that can be explored in an article-length manner. Doing analytic justice to the varied types of distinctiveness of both white and black southern attitudes would require a lengthier manuscript. However, there are also more substantive reasons. Southern whites are an increasingly core part of the Republican Party, and as a diversifying electorate provides electoral benefits for Democrats, the political attitudes of southern whites will be the subject of renewed debate and interest. As such, a careful, empirical assessment of where southern white distinctiveness stands in the twenty-first century is warranted.
Finally, why a focus on religion rather than other factors affecting southern distinctiveness? In particular, there is a strong literature on the relationship between white attitudes and racial context. Key's (2006 Key's ( [1949 ) racial threat hypothesis has been analyzed in great depth, and recent scholarship has affirmed the centrality of race in southern political development. Valentino and Sears, for example, demonstrate the existence of a strong relationship between white racial conservatism and partisan identification in the region (2005) . Focusing on the white southern shift to the Republican Party, Hood et al. (2012) point to increases in black voter mobilization -rather than population size, per se -as the key factor in pushing southern whites towards the GOP. They caution that scholars ignoring racial dynamics "do so at their own risk" (Ibid., 13).
I want to be clear that I agree with this scholarship on the importance of race in southern politics. I focus on religion instead for a couple of reasons. The recent scholarship just noted has done an exemplary job of demonstrating the significance of race in shaping white southern attitudes. I want to make a complementary, rather than critical, point about the role of religion. I argue scholars of religion and politics have not properly assessed the degree to which the South's disproportionate concentration of white Evangelicals impacts assessments of regional distinctiveness.
3 By bringing a new dataset to bear on the relationship between white southern distinctiveness and religion, my goal is to rigorously assess precisely this relationship, as well as offer an assessment of the degree to which the Deep/Peripheral divide remains important.
The South has long been a distinctive region in American politics. Key described in great detail a one-party "solid South" defined to a large degree by racial politics, especially the maintenance of Jim Crow (2006 [1949] ). Since then a two-party South has emergedsee Lamis (1988) for a book-length treatment -with the white South increasingly going Democrats (Knuckey, 2006, p. 57) .
Contemporary political scientists are split on whether the South remains meaningfully different from the rest of the United States, and if so how it does. First, given the significant amount of political change in the postwar South, the degree to which the South as a whole remains distinct is debated. Bartels (2000) suggests there no longer exists regional variation in the relationship between partisanship and presidential vote choice. However, Hillygus and Shields find that, despite recent arguments that the South is losing its historical distinctiveness, in the 2000 election, "the voting calculus of Southern voters differs from the rest of the electorate" (2008, p. 507) . They argue that not only are southerners more conservative, but this conservatism plays a larger role in individual-level decision-making (Ibid., p. 516-518).
Similarly, scholars of southern politics continue to make a compelling case that southern attitudes still differ in a way that matters for studies of American politics more generally (Cotter, Shaffer, and Breaux, 2006; Breaux and Shaffer, 2012 ).
Hillygus and Shields -like much of the literature in American politics -treat the South as one homogeneous region, a second issue I address. This decision is generally made without explicit theoretical rationale. A notable exception is Shafer and Johnston (2006) , who directly attack the idea of dividing the South into subregions. They argue the Peripheral South's growth has led to it becoming "the South" more generally, while the Deep South's demographic decline has left it "a residual" (Ibid., p. 133). In his review of the southern politics subfield, however, Kousser rejects this critique in strong terms, declaring it "unwarranted" (2010, p. 377) . A second goal of this paper is to assess precisely the utility of such subregional distinction in contemporary attitudes and behavior.
I also examine the role of religious identification in shaping these regional distinctions.
While much of the academic literature on religion and American politics falls into the "culture war" debate (Hunter, 1991; McConkey, 2001; Fiorina et al., 2006 ) -which in political science has tended to relate to debates about partisan polarization and red states versus blue states (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Fiorina et al., 2008) -recent work in sociology provides a more in-depth look at the effects of specific religious beliefs. Lewis and Huyser de Bernardo (2010) , for instance, study Evangelicals and argue denominational tradition is a better predictor of political attitudes while self-identification as an Evangelical is a better predictor of partisanship. Froese et al. (2008) use General Social Survey (GSS) data to argue that belief in a punitive God leads to a tension between religious faith and support for civil liberties. Such beliefs relate to the literature on authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996) , which political scientists have recently started to analyze as part of the debate about polarization in American public opinion (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009 ).
Political scientists have also started to more seriously consider the role of religious identification. Barker et al. (2008) argue that as belief in biblical authority increases, so too does the salience of foreign policy issues relative to domestic ones. Other work has challenged con- (Martin, 1996, p. 149) .
While the Democratic Carter can be credited with bringing white Evangelicals into the political mainstream, the group trended strongly Republican starting with Ronald Reagan.
Evangelicalism and southern politics have become increasingly intertwined since then. The
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) came to play an increasingly strong role in southern politics, starting particularly in 1979 when theologically and politically conservative forces began to take control of the institution. This coincided with increasing influence of the SBC in the southern Republican Party (Smith 1997) .
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Such religious identification is not randomly distributed across the country. Figure 1 plots 
Hypotheses
The last section hinted at potential inquiries, but here I state them as testable hypotheses:
H1. White southerners are more conservative than their non-southern counterparts.
Southern political history provides ample reasons to suspect the region might still be quite unique in American politics (Key, 2006 (Key, [1949 ; Black and Black, 1987, 2002; Hillygus and Shields, 2008; Kousser, 2010 ), yet some have suggested economic development, migration from outside the region, and other factors have led to a decline of southern distinctiveness (Shafer and Johnston, 2006) . Hypothesis 1 assesses the relevance of the region considered as a whole.
H2. Whites in the Deep South are more conservative than their Peripheral South counterparts.
The Deep South is poorer, more racially heterogeneous, and less economically developed than the Peripheral South. There is reason to believe subregional variation might exist, but scholars disagree over whether it remains meaningful (Kousser, 2010) or not (Shafer and Johnston, 2006) . Hypothesis 2 addresses this disagreement.
H3. Whites in the individual Deep South states are more conservative than those in the individual Peripheral South states when examined one-by-one.
The division between Deep and Peripheral South states is standard in the study of the region, yet it is generally asserted as inductively plausible (Key, 2006 (Key, [1949 , p. 669; Black and Black, 1987, p. 14) rather than properly tested. Hypothesis 3 looks at the actual empirical patterns to assess whether the individual Deep South states are generally more conservative than the individual Peripheral South states. State-level analysis of this sort is relatively uncommon, but can be useful to scholars interested in the constitutive parts of regions (for a relatively recent example of state-level analysis, see Brace et al., 2002) .
H4. The effect of identifying as a born-again Christian is homogeneous nationally.
If the effect is homogeneous, then exploring its influence on southern distinctiveness is a straightforward affair. If, however, it varies by state, then exploring the confluence of region and religion requires a more interactive approach.
H5. Disproportionate concentration of born-again Christians in the southern states confounds assessments of regional distinctiveness when properly controlled for, lowering estimates of the regional effect.
Identification as a born-again Christian is not widely used as a standard demographic control.
Hypothesis 5 assesses the implications of this methodological neglect.
Definitions, Data, and Methods
Before testing these hypotheses, I first address a few relevant methodological issues.
Definitions
The first question in the study of the South in American politics is how to define the region.
I define the South as the following eleven states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. This is the classic definition used by Key (2006 Key ( [1949 : 11) and the one most widely used in southern politics scholarship today (e.g., Hillygus and Shields 2008; Mickey 2008; Hood et al. 2012 ). I use it for both historical and practical reasons. Historically, these are the eleven states of the former Confederacy, making them a logical grouping. Practically, using the standard definition of the region allows this paper to more easily build on the work of previous scholars, particularly those who have divided these eleven states into their Deep South and Peripheral South subregions.
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To explore subregional variation, I distinguish between the Deep South (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) and the Peripheral South (Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia). This is the traditional breakdown in the southern politics literature (Key, 2006 (Key, [1949 , p. 669; Black and Black, 1987, p. 14 I define born-again Christian status as solely a matter of self-identification. If a respondent answers yes to the question, "Do you consider yourself an evangelical or born-again Christian?," then I assume they are. This is similar to the conception of partisanship described by Green et al. (2002) in that it is grounded in emotional attachment (indeed, they even compare their definition of partisanship to religion [Ibid., p. 6]). Similarly, Lewis
and Huyser de Bernardo argue that "being an evangelical may be a foundational social-psychological identity that, similar to party identity, influences them beyond their denominational affiliation" (2010, p. 124 ). This identity is at least as strong -and perhaps stronger -than partisan identification. whether Iraq was worth it (1=yes, 0=no), and support for "more free trade agreements like NAFTA" (1=favor, 0=oppose or neutral); in 2008, vote choice (1=McCain, 0=Obama), preferences for abortion availability (1=no restrictions, 2=available but with more limits, 3=not available except for rape, incest, or health reasons, 4=never available), support for gay marriage or civil unions (1=full marriage rights, 2=civil unions or domestic partnerships, 3=no legal recognition), whether Iraq was worth it (1=yes, 0=no), and support for "more free trade agreements like NAFTA" (1=favor, 0=oppose or neutral). Variables are coded so that conservative responses are higher.
Data
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Dependent variables were selected with certain criteria in mind. I include vote choice because voter behavior is itself a special concern for political scientists. I look at issues of interest to social conservatives, as these might be especially salient in the region. I also give preference to questions asked in both years. I finally try to utilize questions that were asked to as many respondents as possible. Many questions of interest were only asked for a limited time period, which does not leave a sufficiently large N for state-level analysis. While I would prefer to analyze a more general economic question, for example, the free trade question was asked for a much longer period than similar questions about the minimum wage or labor organizing (which do not come with a sufficient N for state-level analysis).
Methods
My main explanatory variables of interest for Hypothesis 1-3 are region-and state-level dummy variables. I estimate three models for each dependent variable with these terms I treat the group affect measures as continuous variables and estimate these models using OLS regression (this analysis is also replicated using ordered probit models, which are presented in Table 8 of the online appendix). Binary dependent variables are estimated using logistic regression. For the gay marriage and abortion questions in 2008, I allow for the qualitative nature of the ordered categories by using ordered probit models. Tables 1-4 report the results of the regional and subregional models. The state-level models are presented in the online appendix (Tables 5-7) . To provide more substantive meanings when discussing the results, I also calculate marginal effects for the logit models. Each marginal effect is the change in probability associated with that variable when all other explanatory variables are held constant. 8 The variables of theoretical interest are dummy variables: the marginal effect is the discrete change from zero to one, making substantive interpretation rather straightforward. I calculate changes in probabilities for shifts to theoretically interesting categories for the ordered probit models.
To assess Hypothesis 4, whether the effect of being a born-again Christian varies by state or is homogeneous nationally, I estimate multilevel models where the dependent variables used in the previous section (2004 data only because of sample size issues) are modeled as a function of born-again status and the intercepts and slopes are allowed to vary by state.
The same controls are used as before. Multilevel models can be understood as "extensions of regression in which data are structured in groups and coefficients can vary by group" (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 237) . The group here is state, which allows for estimates in which the effect of born-again identification is allowed to have differential effects in each of the states. The 95 percent confidence intervals are generated by simulating the model 1,000 times and cutting off 2.5 percent at each end of the distribution (Ibid., p. 142). 
Results
I present the results in the order of the stated hypotheses.
H1: Do South/non-South differences still exist?
Assessment: Yes. None of the regional terms are significant in either model specification.
Because research on regional variation in foreign policy attitudes is "limited and somewhat dated" (Cotter, Shaffer, and Breaux, 2006, p. 189; see Hero [1965] for an older analysis), I next consider attitudes toward the Iraq war. There is a literature suggesting southerners possess a "culture of honor" (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996) , which might lead to more militaristic foreign policy preferences. Wyatt-Brown examines this in crises ranging from the Civil War to the war in Iraq, arguing that the war in Iraq was actually justified by a southern president using religious themes, rather than themes related to national honor (2005, p. 447). Attention to survey evidence of white southern foreign policy attitudes can elucidate such scholarship from a different vantage point.
White southerners were 7 percent more likely to say Iraq was worth it in 2008, but the Deep South marginal effect is 11 percent compared to 6 percent in the Peripheral South. In 2004, the marginal effect of being from the South is a 6 percent increase in the probability of thinking the war was worth it, but the marginal effect of being from the Deep South is a 10 percent increase in probability, while the marginal effect in the Peripheral South is only 4 percent. The regional trends seem to be robust over time for the Iraq question, not just a function of the electoral climate.
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I finally look at attitudes toward free trade, an economic issue supported by conservatives generally but often opposed by those with lower levels of education, something that could plausibly create an ideological tension among southerners. The South also has a complex history with trade policy. In Key's time period, the South was "the area with the most intense attachment to free trade," at least among congressmen (2006 [1949] Jimmy Carter were more private regarding their faith.
2 "Culture" is a dangerous analytical category, but I use it here for lack of a better term.
3 For analyses using older data, see Ellison and Musick (1993) and Powers et al. (2003) .
4 There is, of course, a tension between how close to the Religious Right a candidate can be in the primary and their probability of winning a general election in a more moderate electorate. For data on this, see Bullock and Smith (2005) .
5 The case for a broader definitions of the region can be made, especially for historical studies. See Farhang and Katznelson (2005) and Springer (2011) for good articulations of this argument. However, in this paper I adhere to the Key-inspired 11-state definition more common to contemporary public opinion studies.
6 This dataset is available online from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.
7 I code support for free trade as "conservative," as this is the position taken by the Republican Party 8 The base categories for the dummy variables are: independent, some college, male; linear predictors are set at their means; and other dummy variables in the regional/state sets are set to 0 when computing each regional/state effect. One can always quibble with the specific values at which the controls are set, but the overall substantive interpretation of the marginal effects is not significantly changed by other specifications.
9 The AIC value is lower for model 2 and a test of the difference between the two subregional terms is highly statistically significant for both years.
10 For all dependent variables mentioned in this paragraph so far, the AIC value is lower for model 2 and a test of the difference between the subregional terms is statistically significant.
11 For both years, the AIC value is lower for model 2 and a test of the difference between the subregional terms is statistically significant. 13 Recall that the 2008 data is not used here due to the much smaller portion of the sample asked the born-again question.
14 These null results are not shown, but are available upon request from the author. 
Online Appendix
This section contains online material supplementing the manuscript text, including:
• Figures for the multilevel modeling results
• More detailed state-by-state analysis of Hypothesis 5
• Regression tables for the state models
• Results of the group affect models using ordered probit rather than OLS a reader trying to assess the impact of the regional variable on attitudes would make an inflated assessment of the regional term's impact without the born-again control variable.
When adding a single additional variable causes the coefficient on the variable of theoretical interest to be cut by nearly half, model specification takes on additional significance.
Finally, the two policy issues offer perhaps the most interesting changes. For the antigay marriage amendment variable, the coefficients on the majority of states lose their initial statistical significance: whites in Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Caroline, Tennessee, and Texas are now not statistically different than the rest of the nation. The Virginia and Florida coefficients are not significant in either model. Only the effects in Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi remain robust with the addition of the born-again control variable.
And even in these states, the logit coefficients decrease by 55 percent, 48 percent, and 45 percent, respectively. The marginal effects decrease from 9 percent to 4 percent in Alabama, 11 percent to 6 percent in Arkansas, and 14 percent to 8 percent in Mississippi.
15 State and regional effects on this issue appear to be heavily influenced by born-again Christianity.
While the pattern of change -from conservative to insignificant -is consistent in the gay marriage models, the changes in the abortion ban models are far more complex. While all states move noticeably to the left -with the exception of Florida, which barely changes -the end result depends on where the state effect started in the previous model specification. The coefficients on Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee -previously significant in the conservative direction -become statistically insignificant. The coefficients on Georgia,
North Carolina, and Texas -previously statistically insignificant -become significant in the liberal direction, with new estimated marginal effects of -5 percent, -4 percent, and -3 percent, respectively. Arkansas and Louisiana remain statistically significant in the conservative direction, but less so -moving from +12 percent to + 7 percent and +8 percent to +7 percent, respectively. Finally, Florida and Virginia remain statistically significant in the liberal direction, with Virginia becoming significantly more liberal, moving from -3 percent to -8 percent, and Florida moving from -3 to -5 percent. The next page contains a version of the group affect measure models (OLS versions presented
State regression tables
in Tables 3 and 6 ) using an ordered probit specification instead. The results are robust, so I have kept the easier to interpret OLS results in the main text. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001. Cutpoints redacted for space, but available upon request.
